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Article 7

VOICES OF
DISSENT
Jonathan Crewe
The Unrepentant Renaissance:
From Petrarch to Shakespeare to
Milton by Richard Strier. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2011.
Pp. 328. $46.00 cloth.

Taking his cue, and virtually his
book title, from Michel de
Montaigne’s essay “Of Repentance”
(“Du repentir”), Richard Strier
argues that major Renaissance,
Reformation,
and
CounterReformation authors did not necessarily uphold what he calls the
official values of the time: reason,
patience, moderation of anger,
subordination of the physical to
the spiritual, ordinary decency and
morality, rejection of materialism
and worldliness, and assertion of
the need for humility. Authors
could, on the contrary, challenge
all these values and often did.
This argument recalled to my
mind a moment in a Shakespeare
Association of America seminar
years ago in which a prominent
English academic, having been
hauled over the coals by seminar
members, finally said, “Oh, I see.
You want me to be humble. Well,
I won’t be.”
For Strier, the official values
represent a Christian–Platonic
synthesis to which all were

expected to subscribe. Strier
wants to make the case that, in
being “bumptious, full-throated,
perhaps perverse” (2), Renaissance
and Reformation authors frequently proved recalcitrant, yet
the reader may already pull up
short to ask, “Who ever thought
otherwise?” Names like those of
Pietro Aretino (surprisingly, not
mentioned in the book), Leon
Battista Alberti, Michelangelo

Criticism Winter 2016, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 147–151. ISSN 0011-1589. doi: 10.13110/criticism.58.1.0147
© 2017 by Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan 48201-1309

147

148

Jonathan Crewe

Buonarotti (as poet), Giordano
Bruno (one footnote), Niccolo
Machiavelli (passing reference),
Galileo
Galilei
(passing
reference), Pico della Mirandola
(not mentioned, although “the
dignity of man” looms large in
the book), François Rabelais (not
mentioned), Benvenuto Cellini
(passing reference), Christopher
Marlowe, John Donne, and Ben
Jonson are known to everyone
and not known for tame acquiescence. (God forbid that we should
recall the painter Caravaggio
here.) Even if one is not on the
lookout for the more insurrectionary spirits, which major
English Renaissance author
was free of bumptiousness, fullthroatedness, or perversity?
William Shakespeare? George
Chapman? John Donne? Philip
Sidney? John Marston? Thomas
Middleton? Andrew Marvell?
The question, then, is why
Strier feels he has to argue a point
that, on the face of it, no one
would dispute. Part of Strier’s
implied answer is that resistance
to the official values could be
pursued on a principled, systematic basis. It wasn’t just a matter
of bad boys (or girls) acting out.
(Regrettable, in a way, since resistance to the official values thus
tends to become more a matter
of principled, civil debate than
misbehavior.) If the official values were Christian and Platonic,
Renaissance authors could appeal

against them to Aristotle for the
vindication of proper pride, of
greatness of mind or soul, and of
just self-estimation. Those values
could be opposed to the official
ones on both ethical and worldly
grounds; ethical in that they discountenanced excessive or futile
self-abjection (not without its own
overreaching vanity); worldly in
that they gave credit to dignified
social appearances. According to
Strier, this ethical Aristotelianism
placed humanistically schooled
Renaissance writers implicitly, but nevertheless often and
deeply, at odds with the leading
Protestant Reformers, Martin
Luther and John Calvin, both of
them insisting on radical human
unworthiness and depravity. In
the reformers’ book, repentance
was certainly called for, even if
it remained unavailing without
grace. Yet even when a writer like
John Milton marched under the
banner of Protestant Christianity,
he remained, in Strier’s view, an
unrepentant Aristotelian. Strier
additionally argues that even the
Neoplatonism of Plotinus could
be enlisted against the prevailing Christian–Platonic synthesis.
Plotinus’s conception of value,
unlike Plato’s, gave pride of place
to multiplicity, diversity, and
expansiveness rather than unity
and circumscription. His conception of value can therefore be
seen as underwriting the triumph
of “infinite variety” (2.2.964) and
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effortless expansiveness in Antony
and Cleopatra.
Strier offers parallel arguments
regarding systematic Renaissance
commitments to pleasure, to the
bodily, to passion and anger (which
“hath privilege,” as Kent says in
King Lear [2.2.1137]), to exuberant,
seductive amorality, and to worldliness. Yet these values were not
always baldly opposed to the official ones, but were often intricately
knotted up with them, sometimes
resulting in excruciated ambivalence on the part of the authors.
For Strier, these countervalues
are exemplified in important
works by Thomas More, Petrarch,
Shakespeare, Ignatius Loyola,
Montaigne, Descartes, and Milton.
Strier supports his contention with
generous, perceptive, ample readings, bringing to bear his wideranging command of the field and
of the languages in which the relevant works were written (Italian,
French, Latin). This is the work
of a mature scholar-teacher with a
good deal to impart.
Indeed, the pedagogic provenance of the book is apparent
everywhere, starting with the dedication “To my students, over the
years, in ‘Renaissance Intellectual
Texts’ at the University of
Chicago.” Much of the book reads
like the record of a graduate seminar, punctuated by teacherly interjections: “[This line] is completely
puzzling”; “But this is all very
subtle”; “This is a truly surprising

149

perspective,” etc. Yet Strier aims
not just to teach but also to correct a major m
 isrepresentation
of the Renaissance. What is
the nature and source of the
misrepresentation?
Regarding the nature of the
misrepresentation, it is that of a
tamed, submissive Renaissance.
Regarding the source, it is that
of Renaissance criticism pursued
by Anglophone critics during the
past thirty years. More narrowly
speaking, responsibility belongs to
the New Historicism and its successors, notably the humoralism
espoused by critics like Gail Kern
Paster and Michael Schoenfeldt.
For Strier, the New Historicism
boils down to Stephen Greenblatt
in Renaissance Self-Fashioning
(1980) and, to a lesser degree, in
Will in the World (2005). The point
of Strier’s critique is not quite
what the opening statements in
the book might lead one to expect.
It is not that Greenblatt and others after him passively read the
Renaissance through the distorting
lens of present-day conservatism
(a common-enough phenomenon).
Rather, it is that the critics’ own
theoretical (epistemological) orientation consistently aligns them
with everything in the Renaissance
that tends to forestall, undermine,
or effectively prohibit departures
from the official values. In Strier’s
view, Greenblatt invokes Jacob
Burckhardt’s The Civilization
of the Renaissance in Italy (1860)
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only to contradict it, repeatedly
denying the efficacy of every
Renaissance assertion of free
individuality, passion, or pleasure. Greenblatt’s “Renaissance
self-fashioning” thus becomes a
paradox, since, in effect, the fashioning comes entirely from the
outside, making the “self” a function of social constraint. Strier
renews allegiance to Burckhardt
by reclaiming the efficacy of
Renaissance aspiration beyond the
constraints of the official values.
(Perhaps Strier would 
consider
Greenblatt’s most recent book The
Swerve [2011], detailing humanistic receptivity to the radically discrepant teachings of Lucretius, to
be back on the right side.)
In Strier’s view, resistance to
the official values does not necessarily have to play out as a high
drama of dissent. Shakespeare’s
The Comedy of Errors looms surprisingly large in his reckoning
as a representation of bourgeois,
conjugal sufficiency and being
at home in the (mercantile)
world. That condition attests in
large part to the highly successful Renaissance innovation of
companionate marriage. If this
innovation hardly seems to flout
the official values, it nevertheless prevails over the suspicion
and bad conscience instilled by
preaching of the official values. One is prompted to reflect,
however, that little evidence of
this success appears elsewhere in

Shakespeare’s work or, indeed,
his life. Strier also devotes little
space to provocative Renaissance
forms of sexual dissent from the
official values. That dissent had
many classical resources, including Ovid, at its disposal.
There is obviously a bigger
story here than I have told or than
Strier necessarily wants to tell
us in detail. As regards the New
Historicism and its aftermath, it is
a story having to do with, among
other things, the impact of Michel
Foucault in the 1980s, with subversion and containment, and with
suspicious (paranoid) reading. I
suspect that for a number of readers this will now seem like an old
story, without much pertinence to
current Renaissance interpretation
(whatever we understand that to
be, bearing in mind that it is not
an Anglophone monopoly). These
readers may therefore be surprised
at Strier’s continuing preoccupation with Greenblatt and the New
Historicism, as if they still retain
a stranglehold on Renaissance
interpretation. Something similar
applies to Strier’s continuing preoccupation with Stanley Fish as
a Milton critic. These preoccupations make the book feel belated
at times—or like the reflection of
a generational mindset—and even
Strier’s reclamation of the high
Burckhardtian Renaissance will
seem belated to some. Yet Strier
in this book has made a judgment
call about what still distorts our
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picture of the Renaissance and
about the continuing foundational
importance of Burckhardt in any
practice of Renaissance interpretation worthy of the name. Readers
will have to make their own judgment call in turn about all this.
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